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1 Introduction
Monetary business cycle models typically feature monopolistic competition; this is to justify
price setting power and sticky prices. At the same time, such models tend to depart from
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) by assuming a xed range of products and rms, an assumption
which in the presence of positive prots is di¢ cult to uphold. In response to this, a largely
theoretical literature has emerged that investigates the role of rm and product entry for
aggregate uctuations.1 In particular, when an increase in the number of competitors reduces
desired markups and ination, this acts as an endogenous propagation and amplication
mechanism.2
Portier (1995) and Cook (2001) are early examples of business cycle models where rm entry,
which ensures zero prots each period, has a negative e¤ect on markups. Floetotto and
Jaimovich (2008) focus on the implications of that entry mechanism for the Solow residual.
Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012), henceforth BGM, show that a model with sunk-cost
driven entry and translog consumption preferences outperforms the standard real business
cycle (RBC) model in terms of matching second moments of certain variables in the data.
Under this preference structure, the price-elasticity of demand is increasing in the number of
available products. Colciago and Etro (2010) do a comparable exercise using a model with
the BGM (2012) entry mechanism and di¤erent oligopolistic market structures.
This paper provides an empirical model validation exercise which is so far missing in the
literature. It uses Bayesian techniques to estimate the e¤ect of entry on markups in a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We seek to answer two questions.
First, how does endogenous entry inuence the cyclical behavior of markups? Second, how
important is this e¤ect in explaining US ination uctuations? In accordance with the
terminology used in Colciago and Etro (2010) and Lewis and Poilly (2012), we refer to the
e¤ect of a change in the number of competing rms or products on price markups as the
competition e¤ectin the remainder of the paper.
Our rst question relates to the dynamics of price-cost markups, which are key in business
1See e.g. Bergin and Corsetti (2008).
2Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) present empirical evidence that markups are negatively related to the
number of competitors in an industry.
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cycle transmission. Consider the standard New Keynesian model. On the one hand, an
expansionary demand shock raises marginal costs. If prices do not adjust fully, markups fall.
On the other hand, an expansionary supply shock lowers marginal costs. If prices do not
adjust fully, markups rise. When entry and exit dynamics are taken into account, markups
may additionally depend on the number of rms or products. The response of entry to a
shock determines how this mechanism works. If an expansionary shock (i.e., one that raises
output) leads to prot opportunities over and above entry costs, new rms and products
enter. Then, desired markups fall and inationary pressures are dampened. In contrast, if
an expansionary shock crowds out entry, desired markups rise, putting upward pressure on
prices which is absent in the no-entry case. Therefore, changes in competition through entry
may amplify or dampen propagation in the New Keynesian model. This paper characterizes
the conditional dynamics of entry (or extensive margin investment) and markups in response
to an array of shocks.
Markups of prices over marginal cost are unobserved and therefore hard to measure. There is
no agreement on the conditional properties of markups in the data, or even on their uncondi-
tional cyclicality. The inuential work by Bils (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
nds evidence of countercyclical markups, while the more recent contribution by Nekarda
and Ramey (2010) presents evidence supporting procyclical markups. We circumvent the
measurement problem by excluding markups from the estimation and focussing instead on
directly observable variables. Kalman ltering techniques allow us to estimate the unob-
served markup series. Using our parameter estimates, we then describe the cyclical behavior
of the markup implied by the model. In addition, we quantify the contribution of changes
in competition and desired markup shocks to the markup-output correlation.
Our second aim is to gauge the importance of the competition e¤ect for hitherto unexplained
ination uctuations, which are labelled cost-push shocks. Cost-push shocks pose a chal-
lenge for central banks since they create a tradeo¤ for monetary policy between ination and
output stabilization.
Firm and product turnover has long been neglected in empirical business cycle research,
e.g., in the inuential studies by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2007). Two exceptions are worth noting, however. Cecioni (2010) estimates a New
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Keynesian Phillips Curve augmented with rm entry. She nds that the pass-through of real
marginal costs to ination becomes stronger when entry and its e¤ect on markups are taken
into account. Lewis and Poilly (2012) estimate two variants of the endogenous-entry model
by minimizing the distance between the model-based impulse responses to a monetary policy
shock and their empirical counterparts. The rst model variant features translog preferences
and a demand-driven competition e¤ect, while the second assumes strategic interactions
between oligopolists and a supply-driven competition e¤ect. They nd that in the rst
model, entry has a signicant e¤ect on markups in the monetary transmission mechanism,
while the second model does not. This paper estimates a DSGE model with endogenous
entry using Bayesian methods as in Smets and Wouters (2007). The model features sunk-
cost driven entry dynamics and a translog expenditure function for intermediate goods, as
well as a host of nominal and real frictions. Assuming a range of exogenous shocks and using
a Bayesian approach allows us to address the two research questions posed above, which is
not possible in the limited information estimation exercise in Lewis and Poilly (2012) or with
the single-equation method of Cecioni (2010).
Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the way the competition e¤ect inuences
business cycle transmission is shock-dependent. Supply shocks and monetary policy shocks
entail a procyclical movement of entry, thereby inducing a countercyclical desired markup
response. Demand shocks, in contrast, lead to a countercyclical response of entry and pro-
cyclical desired markups. Our analysis of transmission channels extends Bilbiie, Ghironi
and Melitz (2007) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012), who consider fewer shocks and a
smaller set of frictions. The model-implied markup is countercyclical once endogenous entry
and shocks to desired markups are taken into account. Second, we carry out a counterfac-
tual analysis of US ination, showing how the historical ination path was altered by the
competition e¤ect.
One potential limitation of our exercise is that we measure entry as rm entry, i.e., net
business formation, new incorporations and establishment births, rather than product entry.
Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012), as well as a number of trade-related studies referenced
therein, emphasize the importance of product turnover for output dynamics. Although it
would be desirable to estimate the model using product data, we are constrained by the lack
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of a long enough time series, covering the universe of products, to carry out such an analysis.
To the extent that product-level dynamics matter more for markup and ination uctuations
than rm entry and exit, our results may understate the importance of entry-induced markup
uctuations.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present an outline of the baseline model.
Section 3 contains details on the estimation method, the data, our choice of priors, and
posterior distribution statistics. In Section 4, we characterize the transmission channels of
various shocks through the competition e¤ect and the overall cyclicality of the model-implied
markup. We also perform a historical decomposition of US ination. Section 5 discusses a
number of robustness exercises. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Our model combines the entry mechanism and the translog expenditure function proposed
by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012) with a set of real and nominal frictions as in Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). We include habit formation
and investment adjustment costs / variable capital utilization. These model features are
deemed necessary to replicate the dynamics of consumption and capital investment, respec-
tively. Entry, which constitutes investment along the extensive margin, can only be captured
adequately if the model accounts well for the other components of aggregate demand.
Most model equations are presented in linearized form.3 Hatted variables denote deviations
from the deterministic steady state. Variables without a hat or time subscript refer to the
steady state level. The equilibrium we consider is symmetric: all households, rms and
entrants are identical.
2.1 Preferences, Entry and Desired Markups
Aggregation over intermediate goods varieties takes the translog form as in Feenstra (2003),
such that the elasticity of demand for an individual good "t is increasing in the number of
3For a full model derivation, see the appendix available at http://sites.google.com/site/vivienjlewis.
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competing rms or goods Nt,4
"t = 1 + Nt, (1)
where   0 denotes the price-elasticity of the spending share on an individual good. In-
tuitively, more product diversity makes demand more elastic, as products become more
substitutable with entry. With a time-varying demand elasticity, the desired markup de-
ned as dt  "t"t 1 is also time-varying. In particular, dt =
1+Nt
Nt
. The desired markup dt
is distinct from the actual markup t which is also a¤ected by price setting frictions. In
linearized form, the desired markup is
^dt =  N^t + ^
U
t , where  =
1
1 + N
. (2)
The variable ^
U
t denotes a reduced form shock to desired markups, which is introduced as
an empirical device to capture variations in ination that remain unexplained by the model
(see equation (8) below).5 The elasticity of the desired markup to the number of rms
captures the competition e¤ect. For  > 0, desired markups are eroded by the arrival
of new entrants. Under a translog expenditure function, this parameter equals the inverse
steady state demand elasticity,  = 1
"
. The real product price t, dened as the ratio of
the nominal product price pt to the aggregate price index Pt, i.e., t  pt=Pt, is a positive
function of the number of rms and products, Nt. In linearized form, this is
^t =
1
2N
N^t. (3)
The elasticity of the real product price to the number of rms/products captures love of
variety, or the degree to which consumers can increase their utility by spreading their
consumption expenditure across more di¤erentiated goods. Love of variety is inversely related
to the steady state number of rms and to the price-elasticity of the spending share .6 The
demand for a single variety is y^t = Y^ Ct   ^t   N^t, where Y Ct denotes the aggregate goods
bundle.
4We use the terms goodsand rms interchangeably throughout, assuming that each rm produces
exactly one di¤erentiated variety.
5In an additional robustness assessment available upon request, we structurally derive ^
U
t as a shock to
the price-elasticity of the expenditure share . We nd that our main results are robust to this alternative
model environment.
6In Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences, love of variety is 1" 1 , where " denotes both the substitution
elasticity between goods as well as the price-elasticity of demand. Floetotto and Jaimovich (2008) assume
zero love of variety, such that no utility gain arises from additional product diversity.
6
2.2 Firms
We consider a two-sector economy where capital and labor are employed to produce goods
and new rms. Let the subscript C denote the goods-producing (manufacturing) sector and
let subscript E denote the entry sector. The aggregate production function for goods states
that output is produced under a Cobb-Douglas technology with capital services K^sC;t and
labor L^C;t, weighted by C and 1  C , respectively, where C 2 (0; 1),
Y^ Ct = ^t + CK^
s
C;t + (1  C) L^C;t + ^
Z
t . (4)
The variable ^
Z
t denotes exogenous total factor productivity (TFP). New rms N^E;t are
produced with an analogous technology,
N^E;t + ^
E
t = EK^
s
E;t + (1  E) L^E;t + ^
Z
t . (5)
The exogenous variable ^
E
t captures entry costs per rm, measured in terms of a composite
of labor and capital services.7 The production structure is symmetric such that the capital
share is the same in the two sectors, C = E = .8 Marginal costs cmct for producing both
goods and rms are a weighted average of the rental rate of capital r^kt and the real wage w^t,
less TFP, cmct = r^kt + (1  ) w^t   ^Zt . Cost minimization by rms implies that the rental
bill and the wage bill are proportional to each other, r^kt + K^
s
C;t = w^t + L^C;t. Perfect factor
mobility equates the capital-labor ratio across the two sectors, K^sC;t   L^C;t = K^sE;t   L^E;t.
Firm-level prots are denoted dt, while aggregate prots are given by
d^t + N^t = ("  1) ^t + Y^ Ct , (6)
where " = 1+ N is the steady state price-elasticity of demand, see (1). Monopolistic rms
set prices as a markup ^t over marginal costs, ^t = ^t + m^ct. Price setters are subject to
a quadratic price adjustment cost of the Rotemberg (1982)-type.9 Non-adjusted prices are
7Entry costs may contain a cyclical component that is not modeled here. For instance, rm startups
may be dependent on bank loans, with the costs of bank nance varying over the business cycle. This would
be captured by the variable ^
E
t .
8In an additional exercise, we set C =  and E = 0. See the sensitivity analysis in Section 5.
9To facilitate aggregation, we assume that rst-time price setters face adjustment costs just like incum-
bent rms. As Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007) show, adopting the alternative assumption, i.e., that price
setting is costless for entrants, does not greatly alter model predictions.
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indexed to lagged ination. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) relates the change
in product prices ^p;t to its lagged and expected future value, and to the di¤erence between
the desired and the actual markup,
^p;t   p^p;t 1 = "  1
p
(^dt   ^t) +  (1  N)Etf^p;t+1   p^p;tg, (7)
where p > 0 is the degree of price stickiness, p 2 (0; 1) is the rate of indexation,  2 (0; 1)
is the representative agents subjective discount factor and Et denotes the expectations
operator conditional on the information set at the beginning of period t. We substitute the
desired markup (2) in (7) to obtain an alternative formulation of the NKPC,
^p;t   p^p;t 1 = "  1
p
( N^t   ^t) +  (1  N)Etf^p;t+1   p^p;tg+ ^
P
t , (8)
where ^
P
t , often referred to as a cost-push shock, is a transformation of the desired markup
shock, ^
P
t =
" 1
p
^
U
t . The variable ^
P
t thus represents an exogenous shift in price markups that
is neither related to price stickiness nor to the arrival of new entrants.10 We multiply the
exogenous component of the desired markup in (2) by " 1
p
in order to have the price markup
shock enter the NKPC with a unit coe¢ cient. Through the competition e¤ect ( > 0), an
increase in the number of rms and goods has a direct negative e¤ect on ination.
2.3 Households
Households derive utility from consuming C^t and disutility from working L^t. The respective
marginal utilities are given by U^C;t =   C1 b(C^t   bC^t 1) and U^L;t = LL^t, where C > 0
is the degree of risk aversion, b 2 (0; 1) captures external habit formation in consumption
and L > 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage.
The household has access to a risk-free one-period nominal bond that pays interest R^t; the
optimal choice of bonds leads to the Euler equation,
U^C;t = Etf(R^t   ^Cp;t+1) + U^C;t+1g+ ^
T
t , (9)
where ^Cp;t is the change in the welfare-based price index Pt. The time preferenceshock
^
T
t reects a disturbance to the growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption. Capital
10Using our estimation results below, we carry out a variance decomposition whereby we quantify the
parts of markup variability that are accounted for by, respectively, price stickiness, the competition e¤ect
and exogenous factors.
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services are the sum of the capital stock K^t and its utilization u^t, K^st = u^t+K^t. The optimal
choice of capital utilization results in a utilization rate that is adjusted to the rental rate of
capital with elasticity a, u^t = ar^kt , where a =
1 eaea and ~a 2 (0; 1) measures utilization
adjustment costs. Accumulation of physical capital takes the form K^t+1 = (1  K) K^t +
K I^t + K (1 + )'K ^
I
t , where I^t is intensive margin investment, i.e., investment in physical
capital, and K 2 (0; 1) is the capital depreciation rate. The term ^It represents an exogenous
shock to investment-specic technology. The optimal choice of physical capital gives rise to
a q-equation,
q^t = Etf (R^t   ^Cp;t+1) + [1   (1  K)] r^kt+1 +  (1  K) q^t+1g, (10)
where the real value of capital q^t depends positively on its expected future value and on the
expected future rental rate, and negatively on the real interest rate. Physical investment
is subject to ow adjustment costs of the type introduced in Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005). As a result, current investment is a function of its lagged and expected future
value, as well as the current value of capital,
I^t =
1
(1 + )'K
q^t +

1 + 
EtfI^t+1g+ 1
1 + 
I^t 1 + ^
I
t , (11)
where 'K captures investment adjustment costs at the intensive margin. Extensive margin
investment is determined analogously. The number of rms and goods evolves according to
the following law of motion, N^t+1 = (1  N) N^t + NN^E;t, where N is the rm exit rate.
The value of a rm v^t depends positively on its expected future value, on expected future
dividends, and negatively on the real interest rate,
v^t = Etf (R^t   ^Cp;t+1) + [1   (1  N)] d^t+1 +  (1  N) v^t+1g. (12)
The number of entrants depends on its lagged and expected future value, and on the di¤erence
between rm value and the entry cost cmct + ^Et ,
N^E;t =
1
(1 + )'N
[v^t   (cmct + ^Et )] + 1 + EtfN^E;t+1g+ 11 +  N^E;t 1, (13)
where 'N captures investment adjustment costs at the extensive margin.
11 Total investment
is the sum of intensive and extensive margin investment, cTI t = ITI I^t+ vNETI (cmct+ N^E;t+ ^Et ).
11For a more detailed derivation of the dynamic entry equation (13), see Lewis and Poilly (2012).
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We assume monopolistic wage setters and sticky wages as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000). In addition, we stipulate that non-adjusted wages are indexed to price ination with
coe¢ cient w. Wage ination ^w;t is thus determined as follows,
^w;t   w^p;t 1 = w   1
w
[(U^L;t   U^C;t)  w^t] + Et f^w;t+1   w^p;tg+ ^Wt , (14)
where w > 0 is the degree of wage stickiness, w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
labor types, and ^
W
t denotes an exogenous shock to wage ination.
2.4 Market Clearing
The aggregate goods bundle Y^ Ct is a weighted average of private consumption C^t, physical
capital investment I^t, the costs of adjusting the utilization rate u^t and exogenous government
consumption ^
G
t ,
Y^ Ct =
C
Y C
C^t +
I
Y C
I^t +
rkK
Y C
u^t + ^
G
t . (15)
Let Y^t denote total expenditure, which equals goods output and investment at the extensive
margin, Y^t = Y
C
Y
Y^ Ct +
vNE
Y
(m^ct + N^E;t + ^
E
t ). The market clearing conditions for labor and
capital services are, respectively, L^t = LCL L^C;t +
LE
L
L^E;t and K^st =
KC
K
K^sC;t +
KE
K
K^sE;t.
2.5 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing. The interest rate
is adjusted in response to the level and the growth rate of the output gap, to product price
ination and to the lagged interest rate,
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R) (^p;t + Y Y^ gapt ) +  dyY^ gapt + ^
R
t (16)
where  is the rst di¤erence operator and Y^ gapt is the output gap as measured by the
central bank. An exact denition of the output gap is deferred to Section 3.1. The term
^
R
t represents an exogenous monetary policy shock. We estimate the model on data up to
the start of the Great Recession. During a period where the economy is at the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates, the postulated monetary policy rule is no longer applicable.
Including the most recent period would distort our estimates.
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2.6 Exogenous Shock Processes
Table 1 summarizes the functional forms assumed for the eight exogenous shocks. We group
these shocks as follows. TFP shocks ^
Z
t , entry cost shocks ^
E
t and wage markup shocks ^
W
t
constitute supply shocks, which a¤ect marginal costs of production in (one of) the two
sectors. Government spending shocks ^
G
t , investment-specic technology shocks ^
I
t and time
preference shocks ^
T
t are classied as demand shocks. Monetary policy shocks ^
R
t and price
markup shocks ^
P
t are treated as separate categories.
[ insert Table 1 here ]
Except for the government spending and markup shocks, all disturbances follow AR(1)
processes in logarithmic terms. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), disturbances to price
and wage markups follow ARMA(1; 1) processes; the moving average terms pick up high-
frequency movements in ination. Government spending is also a¤ected by the innovation
in the TFP-process. This specication is designed to capture the unmodeled variations in
net exports, which may be a¤ected by domestic productivity developments.
3 Estimation
We apply Bayesian estimation techniques as in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez
(2004) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). For a detailed description, we refer to the
original papers. In a nutshell, using the Bayesian paradigm prior information is combined
with the data to obtain posterior distributions for the parameters.12 In the following, we
describe the data sources and transformations, before turning to our choice of priors and to
the posterior distributions of the model parameters.
3.1 Data
In the model, real variables are deated by the welfare-based price index Pt, which is un-
observed. Empirical measures of the price index correspond rather to the product price pt,
12We use 600,000 iterations of the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm to simulate the posterior
distributions and achieve acceptance rates of approximately 35% in all our specications. We discard the
initial 4% of the drawings to compute the posterior moments in each case. We monitor the convergence of
the marginal posterior distributions using CUMSUM statistics as dened by Bauwens, Lubrano and Richard
(1999).
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given that consumption baskets are not updated frequently enough to fully take into ac-
count the welfare e¤ects from product turnover. Moreover, even if the composition of the
consumption basket were adjusted at an adequate frequency, the price index computed by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) would nevertheless be inconsistent with the translog
expenditure function proposed here. Thus, to link the model with the data, we strip out the
variety e¤ect on the price index by multiplying each real variable by Pt and dividing by pt.
For any real variable zt in the model, the linearized data-consistent counterpart then reads
z^Rt = z^t   ^t. In the monetary policy rule (16), the output gap is dened as the deviation of
data-consistent output from steady state, Y^ gapt = Y^
R
t .
In our baseline specication, we estimate the model using eight series of US quarterly data.
These are output, consumption, investment, hours, net business formation, real wages, in-
ation and the interest rate. These eight time series are used to identify the eight structural
innovations in the theoretical model, see Table 1. Our vector of observables is thus
Yt = (Y^
R
t ; C^
R
t ;
cTIRt ; N^E;t; L^t; w^Rt ; ^p;t; R^t). (17)
Data sources and ltering are as follows. Series for GDP, consumption and investment are
obtained from the US Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), personal consumption expenditures include durable goods
consumption. Investment is measured as gross xed private domestic investment, which ab-
stracts from changes in inventories. As our benchmark measure of entry, we use net business
formation. New incorporations and establishment births serve as robustness checks. Net
business formation is published in the BEAs Survey of Current Business and covers the
majority of US businesses. The original data source is the Dun and Bradstreet Corporation.
This series has been discontinued; data run from January 1948 to September 1995. New
incorporations are obtained from the same source, with an almost identical sample period.
This explains why the sample period in our baseline estimation (from 1957Q1 until 1995Q3)
ends so early. The number of establishment births is available from the BLS from 1993Q2
onwards. Data for hours and wages are from the US Department of Labor - BLS. Following
Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide (2002), who point to the limited coverage of the nonfarm
business sector compared to GDP, we multiply the index of average hours for the nonfarm
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business sector (all persons) by civilian employment (16 years and over). The interest rate
is the E¤ective Federal Funds Rate from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. Ination is measured as the rst di¤erence of the log implicit price deator of GDP
(from the BEA).
All raw series are seasonally adjusted using the Census X12 method. All nominal variables
are deated with the GDP deator. The aggregate real variables are expressed in per capita
terms, by dividing by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population over 16 (from the BLS), and
linearly detrended in logarithmic terms. The ination rate and the nominal interest rate are
demeaned by subtracting their respective sample averages.
3.2 Priors
An overview of our priors can be found in Table 2. Six parameters are xed. The subjective
discount factor is set to  = 0:99, implying a steady state annualized real interest rate of
4%. Physical capital depreciates at an annual rate of 10%, i.e., K = 0:025. Similarly, the
rm/product exit rate is set to N = 0:025, so as to t the job destruction rate observed
in US data. This value is also consistent with an average product drop rate of 9% per year
as reported by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010). The parameter of the Cobb-Douglas
production function capital share is calibrated to  = 0:24, which implies a mean labor share
in GDP of three quarters. The government consumes roughly one fth of all goods produced,
G=Y C = 0:21. Finally, following Smets and Wouters (2007) the elasticity of substitution
between di¤erent labor types is set at w = 3, implying a net wage markup of 50%.
[ insert Table 2 here ]
The prior distributions on the shock parameters are quite di¤use, with beta distributions
with mean 0:5 and standard deviation 0:15 for the autoregressive and moving average co-
e¢ cients, and inverse gamma distributions with mean 0:1 and standard deviation 2 for the
standard errors of the innovations. For most of the structural parameters we use priors
as imposed by Smets and Wouters (2007). The monetary policy parameters, however, are
given gamma distributions, instead of normal distributions, to impose a lower bound of zero.
The Rotemberg price and wage adjustment cost parameters, p and w, are assumed to be
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gamma distributed with mean 50 and a standard deviation of 7:5. The mean lies between
the value of p = 77, estimated by Ireland (2001), and the prior mean of p = w = 20,
imposed by Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik (2008). Moreover, a Rotemberg parameter of
50 corresponds to an average contract duration of approximately 4:5 quarters in the Calvo
model, a value which lies in the ballpark of estimates obtained from the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve literature. Our results are robust to imposing a smaller prior mean for p.
For the demand elasticity " we impose a di¤use normal distribution with mean 4 and stan-
dard deviation 1:5. This suggests an average price markup of 33%, which lies in the middle
of the range of 15% to 45% that is typically reported for the US average price markup, e.g.,
Hall (1988), Roeger (1995), Basu and Fernald (1997), Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999)
and Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008).
3.3 Posterior Estimates
In the following, we discuss our posterior estimates and contrast them, where possible, with
the existing empirical evidence from the xed-variety literature. Our baseline estimation
results are reported in Table 2, which summarizes the modes, means and the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distributions. We discuss the mean estimates of the standard
parameters rst, before turning to the entry-related parameters.
While our estimates of the standard parameters are in line with the literature, several ob-
servations are worth making. Compared to business cycle models without entry (see, e.g.,
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005 and Smets and Wouters 2007), our estimates of
investment adjustment costs and of capital utilization costs are somewhat higher at about
'K = 8:7 and ~a = 0:73, respectively. Recall that total investment data is matched with the
sum of intensive and extensive margin investment in our model, while in the xed-variety
model the investment series proxies physical capital investment only. For the Rotemberg
price and wage stickiness parameters p and w, we obtain values of 62 and 57, respectively,
which corresponds to an average contract duration of approximately 4 quarters for prices
and 2:5 quarters for wages in the Calvo analog.13 These estimates are at the lower end of
13As seen in equation (7), the Rotemberg adjustment scheme delivers a coe¢ cient " 1 on the markup gap
in the NKPC. In the Calvo analog of the NKPC, this slope coe¢ cient is (1 )(1 ) , where
1
1  determines
the duration of price stickiness. Therefore, it is possible to compare the slope coe¢ cients given by the two
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those obtained in the macro literature, but are in line with the micro evidence on the fre-
quency of price adjustment, e.g., Blinder et al. (1998) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
The estimated monetary policy parameters are consistent with existing evidence: we observe
substantial interest rate smoothing (R = 0:73) and a response coe¢ cient on ination that
satises the Taylor Principle ( = 1:49). With  y = 0:01, the response to output is barely
signicant.
Adjustment costs in entry are estimated at 'N = 2:42. This is substantially lower than
the value above 8 reported in Lewis and Poilly (2012), who estimate a model similar to
the one presented above by impulse response matching techniques. This di¤erent result can
be explained by the di¤erent stochastic structures of the two models. In Lewis and Poilly
(2012), uctuations are driven only by monetary policy shocks. Here, however, we consider
a range of shocks. To our knowledge, no other empirical evidence on this parameter exists.
In our steady state, entry costs are 10:5% of GDP, i.e., vNE
Y
= 0:105. Empirical estimates of
the share of entry costs in output vary widely, with our gure lying somewhere in the middle.
Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011) pin down entry costs using available estimates of the ratio
of entry-to-operating cost ratio. For the US, they report a benchmark estimate of entry
costs, as a fraction of output per worker, of 20:8%. An alternative calibration in Barseghyan
and DiCecio (2011), using the evolution of rmsproductivity over time, yields a smaller
estimate of 12:15%. A third measure is constructed as follows. The World Banks Doing
Business project (www.doingbusiness.org) reports the number of days needed to register a
rm. Dividing this number by 264 (22 working days per month, times 12 months), gives the
time in years that represents an entrepreneurs opportunity cost of starting a business. For
the US, we have an entry cost of 6/264=0.0227 years per capita, or 2:27% of annual GDP
per capita. The World Bank reports that legal fees to register a business amount to 1:4%
of per capita income in the US in the year 2011. Fourth, Ebell and Haefke (2009) compute
a composite measure of entry costs in the US in 1997 equal to 0:59 months of output. This
measure combines information on entry fees as well as entry delays (number of business
days needed to fulll entry requirements, weighted by the number of procedures) which are
price adjustment schemes, and to interpret the Rotemberg cost in price duration terms. Strictly speaking,
however, we cannot compute an average price contract duration in our model, as this requires a constant
population of price setters.
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converted into lost output.
Our main parameter of interest is the price-elasticity of demand, which determines the steady
state markup, the competition e¤ect, as well as consumerslove of variety. We nd a mean
estimate of " = 6:1 in our baseline estimation, which implies that price markups are 20% on
average. While this estimate accords well with the results reported in many micro studies
of average markups (e.g., Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta, 1999, and Christopoulou and
Vermeulen, 2008), it is signicantly lower than the 60% steady state markup implied by the
Smets and Wouters(2007) model with xed costs and no entry. Lewis and Poilly (2012),
whose set of observables includes a markup measure, also nd a lower demand elasticity
(" = 2:5). In Section 5 we investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative specications
and sets of observables.
Turning to the derived parameters, the posterior distribution of " implies that the compe-
tition e¤ect , the inverse of the demand elasticity, has a mean value of  = 0:17. Hence,
desired markups fall by 0:17% in response to a 1% increase in the number of rms. Cecioni
(2010) uses single-equation techniques to estimate the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (8).
She nds a value of 1:2. In her model, the competition e¤ect is supply-driven and stems from
an oligopolistic market structure. In contrast, our model with translog expenditure cannot
generate a value above unity given the lower bound on the demand elasticity, "  1. While
our estimate of  is statistically signicant, we investigate below if this e¤ect is also eco-
nomically important in driving ination. Using the calibrated parameters and the posterior
mean of ", we can compute the steady state number of rms. Given the relation between the
demand elasticity " and the number of rms N in (1), we derive the price-elasticity of the
spending share  = 0:61. Thus, in response to a 1% price increase for an individual variety,
the spending share drops by 0:61%.
4 E¤ect of Entry on Markups and Ination
This section analyzes markup and ination dynamics in the presence of endogenous entry
as predicted by the model. First, we highlight how the competition e¤ect works conditional
on a specic expansionary shock. Second, we examine the unconditional properties of the
model-implied markup, in particular its cyclicality. Third, we examine in greater detail the
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sources of US ination dynamics based on a historical decomposition.
4.1 Transmission Channels
Figure 1a depicts the impulse responses of selected variables to the three supply shocks.
Consider the rst two panels showing the dynamics triggered by shocks to TFP and wage
markups. Favorable movements in both shocks, i.e., positive TFP shocks and negative wage
markup shocks, lower real marginal costs in both sectors. Prices are sticky and do not
fall by the same amount. Therefore, actual markups rise, which increases prots and rm
value through (6) and (12), respectively. The fall in entry costs and the rise in rm value
lead to entry (13) and a gradual decline in desired markups via the competition e¤ect (2).
Consequently, in response to standardsupply shocks, the competition e¤ect mitigates the
procyclical impact of price stickiness on markups. After approximately 6 to 8 quarters, the
competition e¤ect dominates and actual markups fall.
[ insert Figure 1a here ]
An exogenous decrease in entry costs directly raises entry through (13). This leads to an
eventual decrease in the desired markup through the competition e¤ect, see (2). Initially,
there is a reallocation of production factors from the manufacturing sector to new startups,
implying a decrease in GDP on impact. However, the rise in extensive margin investment
eventually pushes output above steady state. The ensuing rise in aggregate demand raises
marginal costs and prices. Due to price adjustment costs, actual markups decrease. Actual
markups decline by more than desired markups. Therefore, ination rises through the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (7).
Next, we examine the propagation of demand shocks. We notice from Figure 1b that all
three shocks generate strong crowding-out e¤ects at the extensive margin. The monetary
tightening in reaction to expansionary demand shocks implies an increase in the real interest
rate, which in turn lowers rm value through (12). This e¤ect leads to a fall in entry through
(13) and puts upward pressures on desired markups via the competition e¤ect (2). The
dominant e¤ect on markups, however, stems from price stickiness. An exogenous increase in
demand raises marginal production costs more than prices, inducing actual markups to fall.
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The competition e¤ect thus mitigates the countercyclical response of markups to demand
shocks.
[ insert Figure 1b here ]
The model predicts that aggregate prots decrease following an expansionary monetary
policy shock (displayed in the upper panel of Figure 1c).14 Despite the decrease in prots,
entry rises. This is in line with the evidence reported in Bergin and Corsetti (2008), Lewis
(2009) and Lewis and Poilly (2012). The explanation is that the interest rate decline entails a
decrease in the expected return on shares to eliminate arbitrage across assets. The expected
return on shares falls through a rise in the current relative to the future share price. This rise
in rm value exceeds the rise in marginal costs (i.e., entry costs).15 On balance, therefore,
entry expands and the desired markup falls through (2). As a result, the competition e¤ect
augments the countercyclical e¤ect of price stickiness on markups in the case of monetary
policy shocks.
Finally, the bottom panel in Figure 1c shows the e¤ects of an expansionary price markup
shock (a decrease in ^
P
t ), which lowers ination through the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(7) and boosts demand. The ensuing boom drives up marginal costs; because of price
stickiness, actual markups fall. Aggregate prots and entry decrease.
To sum up, the model predicts a procyclical entry response to supply shocks and to monetary
policy shocks, but a countercyclical response to demand shocks. As a result, through the
competition e¤ect, desired markups are countercyclical in response to supply shocks and
monetary policy shocks, but procyclical following demand shocks. The competition e¤ect,
therefore, augments the countercyclical e¤ect of price stickiness on markups in the case of
monetary policy shocks, whereas it counteracts the sticky price e¤ects on markups in response
to supply and demand shocks. Exogenous disturbances to the price markup eventually lead
to countercyclical entry.
14An expansionary monetary policy shock engenders two opposing e¤ects on prots. A decline in the
interest rate leads to an increase in marginal costs and, given that prices do not adjust fully, to a decrease
in actual markups ^t. This rst e¤ect depresses prots. However, a decline in the interest rate also has
expansionary e¤ects on aggregate demand Y^ Ct , which raises prots. In accordance with Bilbiie, Ghironi and
Melitz (2007), our estimates imply that the rst e¤ect dominates, such that prots decrease on net.
15This is in contrast with Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007), where entry costs are very responsive to
shocks due to full wage exibility. In that model, entry drops after a monetary policy expansion.
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4.2 The Cyclicality of the Markup
Here we study the unconditional cyclicality of the markup implied by the model. There are
three reasons for the markup to vary. These are the e¤ect of entry on desired markups (i.e.,
the competition e¤ect), sticky prices, and exogenous price markup shocks. We conduct 300
stochastic simulations based on random draws from the posterior distribution and back out,
for each of these simulations, rst, the model-implied markup ^t, second, the component
driven by sticky prices and markup shocks ^noEt (i.e., the counterfactual markup series ob-
tained in the absence of entry), and, third, the sticky-pricecomponent ^SPt . To compute
^noEt we shut o¤rm entry and exit dynamics in the stochastic simulation by assuming a large
entry adjustment cost parameter 'N .
16 We then simulate the model using our benchmark
parameter estimates, that is, without re-estimation. Finally, to compute the sticky-price
component, we again assume 'N  0 and perform the stochastic simulation, excluding the
price markup shock (^
P
t = 0). The resulting markup series, denoted ^
SP
t , reects variations
in the model-implied markup under constant desired markups.
Similar to Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012), we then compute for each of the model simula-
tions the correlation of the three markup series with output at various leads and lags. Since
our model includes a whole array of structural shocks, this exercise should provide a real-
istic description of what a DSGE model with endogenous entry implies for (unconditional)
markup variations. Figure 2 plots the mean and the 5th and 95th percentile correlations
corr(Y^ Rt+s; ^t), corr(Y^
R
t+s; ^
noE
t ) and corr(Y^
R
t+s; ^
SP
t ) for s =  5; 4; : : : ; 0; : : : ; 5.
[ insert Figure 2 here ]
The model-implied markup is countercyclical at all leads and lags. If we switch o¤ rm
entry and the competition e¤ect, the correlation between the markup and output rises; the
contemporaneous correlation corr(Y^ Rt ; ^
noE
t ) is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. If, in
addition, we eliminate price markup shocks, the cyclicality turns positive: the sticky-price
component is signicantly procyclical. Thus, it is the combination of the competition e¤ect
and price markup shocks that reverses the sign of the markup-output correlation. Recall from
16The no-entry model is obtained as the limiting case of our benchmark model for an arbitrarily large
entry cost parameter 'N .
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Figures 1a-c that entry is procyclical in response to supply shocks and monetary policy shocks
(such that the competition e¤ect leads to countercyclical markups), but countercyclical in
response to demand shocks (such that the competition e¤ect leads to procyclical markups).
The result that ^t is countercyclical reects the importance of supply shocks in driving
aggregate uctuations.
Figure 3 presents a forecast error variance decomposition for output Y^ Rt , ination ^p;t and
markups ^t. For these three variables, TFP and wage markup shocks are an important
source of volatility, while entry cost shocks hardly matter.17
[ insert Figure 3 here ]
Long run output variability is explained almost entirely by two supply shocks: wage markup
shocks and TFP shocks (each approximately 45%). In the short run, the sources of output
uctuations are more mixed: government spending shocks and TFP each account for around
one fth, investment-specic technology for one third. The variation in the markup is mainly
accounted for by a combination of TFP and price markup shocks (each 30% in the long run);
entry cost shocks and wage markup shocks each explain about 15% of markup uctuations.
To conclude, we nd a major role for supply-type shocks in driving output and markup
uctuations. Since, through the competition e¤ect, supply shocks are a source of markup
countercyclicality, the model-implied correlation between markups and output is negative
overall.
4.3 A Historical Decomposition of US Ination
Within standard DGSE models, ination uctuations are mainly accounted for by cost-push
shocks that capture exogenous variations in desired markups. Such shocks pose a challenge
for central banks since they create a tradeo¤for monetary policy between ination and output
stabilization. Policy makers want to understand the underlying causes of desired markup
uctuations. The competition e¤ect we investigate in this paper is one such possible driving
source. Therefore, in this section we aim the gauge the importance of this transmission
channel for hirtherto unexplained ination uctuations.
17Most of the variability in entry is explained by its own shock ^Et . More detailed results are available
from the authors upon request.
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In the following, we perform a historical decomposition of US ination. More specically,
we decompose US ination into a sticky-price component plus two components reecting
endogenous and exogenous variations in the desired markup. The approach is similar to the
markup decomposition of Section 4.2. We lter out the contribution of exogenous desired
markup shocks to ination. To this end, we feed the price markup shock series ^
P
t into
the model, setting all other shocks to zero, and denote the resulting ination series ^Pp;t. In
addition, we are interested in two types of endogenous driving forces of ination. The rst
^SPp;t captures the endogenous sticky-price channel of ination uctuations that characterizes
the (hybrid) New Keynesian model. Through this channel, current ination is driven by
marginal costs and expected future ination (through price stickiness) and by lagged ination
(through indexation to past ination). We set all parameter values to their baseline estimates
in Table 2. Then, we feed the shocks into the model, excluding entry dynamics by assuming
a large entry cost 'N and setting the price markup shock to zero, ^
P
t = 0. The resulting
ination path is what we call sticky-price ination, determined through the modied New
Keynesian Phillips Curve,
^SPp;t   p^SPp;t 1 =
"  1
p
( ^SPt ) +  (1  N)Etf^SPp;t+1   p^SPp;t g. (18)
The sticky-price component^SPt is the counterfactual markup series that we obtain under
constant desired markups, that is, in the absence of a competition e¤ect and price markup
shocks. The second endogenous component ^Ep;t denotes the competition e¤ect on ination,
and is computed as the actual ination rate, less sticky-price ination, less the contribution
of price markup shocks,
^Ep;t = ^p;t   ^SPp;t   ^Pp;t: (19)
Figure 4a plots the quarterly ination rate in the US from 1957q1 to 1995q2 and its three
components ^SPp;t , ^
E
p;t and ^
P
p;t.
[ insert Figure 4a here ]
Compared with the sticky-price component and the exogenous component, the competition
e¤ect plays a smaller, but nevertheless noticeable role in driving US ination. In the late
1960s and between 1985 and 1995, ination was reduced through the competition e¤ect. A
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no-entry model would attribute this endogenous component of ination to negative cost-
push shocks. From the mid 1970s to the mid 80s, ination rose as a result of changes in
competition. An econometrician using a model without endogenous entry would in this case
identify positive cost-push shocks to ination.
As a robustness check, we estimated the model for the period 1993q2-2007q4 where entry
NE;t is measured as the number of establishment births, see Section 5. Our previous nding
is conrmed in the later sample: the competition e¤ect is less important than the other two
driving forces.
[ insert Figure 4b here ]
Figure 4b shows that, prior to 1997, changes in competition exerted a small positive e¤ect
on ination. Between 1997 and 2002, and again from 2004 until 2007, the competition e¤ect
dampened ination by as much as 0:1% on a quarterly basis. This endogenous negative
cost-push shock helped to reduce the need for monetary policy tightening by the central
bank in order to contain inationary pressures.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
This section subjects our estimate of the demand elasticity " to a thorough sensitivity analy-
sis. In a rst set of exercises, we investigate two alternative model specications and compare
their performance with the baseline specication in terms of marginal data densities. First,
we estimate a exible-price version of the model. Second, we consider the asymmetric pro-
duction structure favored by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012), where new rms are set up
using labor services only.
In a second set of exercises, we use alternative or additional data series in estimating our
baseline model. First, we replace the GDP deator with the producer price index (PPI)
in our estimation. Second, we treat prots as an additional observable variable and extend
the model by adding a white-noise measurement error to the prot function (6). Third, we
introduce the inverse labor share as a measure of the price markup in the list of observables
and add a measurement error to this additional observable in the model.
A nal set of exercises considers di¤erent mappings between entry in the model and business
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formation in the data.
[ insert Tables 3a to 3c here ]
The results of these robustness exercises are displayed in Tables 3a to 3c. We discuss them
in turn.
5.1 Alternative Model Specications
Flexible-Price Model To begin with, consider the parameter estimates of the exible-
price model variant in column Flex-Priceof Table 3a. The estimation procedure imposes
a negligible value for the price adjustment cost parameter, more specically p = 0:01. Be-
cause of this low calibrated value of p, we no longer rescale the desired markup shock in the
NKPC (8) by the factor " 1
p
; i.e., in this alternative model specication we have ^
P
t = ^
U
t .
Several estimates change signicantly relative to the baseline results. Some of the empirically
observed ination uctuations are now picked up by exogenous factors. When we take into
account the di¤erences in the scaling of the shock ^
P
t between the current robustness check
and the baseline case, the innovation of the price markup shock rises signicantly. Addi-
tionally, the price markup shock displays a lower moving average coe¢ cient. The demand
elasticity " rises to 9, which reduces the competition e¤ect  to 0:11. This result is some-
what surprising, since a reduction in p is expected to lower " to keep the slope of the NKPC
unchanged. The absence of persistence through price indexation appears to be compensated
to some degree by a higher wage indexation parameter, w = 0:82.
[ insert Figure 5 here ]
In Figure 5, we redo the exercise evaluating the role of the competition e¤ect in shaping
markup cyclicality for the case of exible prices. We notice that, similar to the sticky-
price model, the competition e¤ect in the ex-price model induces countercyclical markup
variations. Moreover, relative to the baseline model, the countercyclicality of price markups
is higher under exible prices. We may interpret this nding as implying that price rigidity
is redundant in producing countercyclical markup variations. However, importantly, the
Bayes-factor analysis comparing the marginal data densities of the baseline and perturbed
models indicates that the sticky-price model is superior to the ex-price model (see bottom of
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Table 3a); specically, the Bayes factor between these two model variants approaches innity.
The better performance of the baseline model can be seen from the reduced importance of
the price markup shock in capturing ination dynamics.
Asymmetric Sectors As a second robustness check, we consider an alternative specica-
tion for entry costs consisting only of labor costs. Concretely, in the technology with which
new rms are produced (5), the parameter E is set to zero. Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz
(2012) remove capital from the production of new rms because their model has a unique
non-explosive solution only for very high rates of capital depreciation.18 We circumvent
this problem by introducing adjustment costs in both intensive and extensive margin in-
vestment.19 The last column of Table 3a reports the parameter estimates under the heading
AsymPF. Two observations stand out. First, the demand elasticity increases relative to the
baseline estimate. Second, as " increases, the price indexation parameter p also increases. A
possible explanation is that, as noted by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007), the endogenous-
entry NKPC entails more ination persistence because the number of varieties Nt is a state
variable. Hence, the higher is the demand elasticity, the smaller is the competition e¤ect and
the less important is the endogenous persistence generated by entry, necessitating a higher
degree of indexation.20 Comparing the log marginal data densities, the model variant with
asymmetric production structures does worse than the baseline model but better than the
exible-price model. See bottom of Table 3a.
5.2 Alternative and Additional Data Series
Producer Price Ination Next, we re-estimate the baseline model, replacing the GDP
deator with the producer price index (PPI) as our price index measure. The idea here is
that the PPI corresponds more closely to the index pt in the model, which does not take
variety e¤ects on consumption utility into account. Quarterly data for the PPI of nished
18See the working paper version of Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012).
19The model solution is indeterminate if the adjustment of both intensive and extensive margin investment
is costless. Assuming adjustment costs along one of the two margins restores determinacy.
20Note that love of variety also generates some additional persistence. Even after transforming the model
as explained in Section 3.1, the variety e¤ect does not vanish in the case where risk aversion C is greater
than 1 and/or habits b are greater than 0. See also Lewis and Poilly (2012).
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goods are obtained from the BLS. The results are shown in Table 3b in the column entitled
PPI. The greater volatility of the PPI series in comparison to the GDP deator shows up in
several places. First and foremost, the greater data volatility is reected in an increased price
markup shock innovation p, which more than doubles. The TFP innovation also increases.
The persistence-inducing frictions lose importance, as evidenced by a decrease in price and
wage indexation, consumption habits, and capacity utilization costs. The price adjustment
cost parameter falls signicantly, while demand becomes more elastic, " rises to 8.6. As a
consequence, the slope of the NKPC rises, reecting a lower overall rigidity in price setting.
The competition e¤ect decreases somewhat to  = 0:12.
Using Prot Data in Estimation In a fourth exercise, we investigate whether con-
sidering prot data in our estimation greatly changes the results. In particular, we add
data-consistent aggregate prots D^Rt = d^t + N^t   ^t to the set of observables Yt. To avoid
stochastic singularity a problem that arises when having more variables than shocks we
include an exogenous iid normal error term ^
D
t with mean zero and standard deviation D
in the measurement equation of rm prots, such that (6) becomes
D^Rt = ("  1) ^t + Y^ Ct   ^t + "^Dt . (20)
Quarterly data for corporate prots after taxes are taken from the NIPA tables. The para-
meter estimates are summarized in column Protsof Table 3b. The mean demand elasticity
increases to about " = 8:6 when we include prots, which lowers the competition e¤ect of
entry.21 This can be explained by the large volatility of prots in the data and conrms
the prot volatility puzzle. Small changes in the markup can generate large prot move-
ments only if the corresponding elasticity, "  1, is large, see (6). From existing research we
know that neither the xed-variety DSGE model (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans,
2005), nor the endogenous-entry model (see Colciago and Etro, 2010; Lewis and Poilly, 2012)
succeeds in explaining well the observed prot dynamics.
21The value " = 8:6 lies in the upper tail of the prior distribution. The cumulative probability at this
value equals 0:999. Therefore, our prior distribution might be too restrictive relative to the information
contained in the data. In an additional robustness check available upon request, we impose a looser prior on
", namely a gamma distribution with mean 4 and standard deviation 2:5. In this case, " increases to 9:14,
which lies within the 92% condence interval of the prior distribution.
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Using Markup Measure in Estimation The behavior of the markup is crucial for the
ndings of this paper. Critics may argue that one should include a markup proxy as an
observable in the estimation exercise. To respond to this (justied) criticism, we add the
least controversial measure of the markup, namely the inverse labor share, to the list of
observables Yt. Again, we also need to add a measurement error so as to have an equal
number of shocks and observables. Specically, we include an iid normal error term ^

t in
the measurement equation for price markups ^, such that the observable markup ^obs reads
^obs = ^+ ^

t . (21)
The results can be found in the last column of Table 3b under the heading Markup. None
of the parameter estimates changes signicantly when we include a markup measure in the
estimation.
5.3 Mapping between Model and Data
Finally, we investigate whether the mapping of entry in the model and business formation
in the data is important. We do this in order to address the concern that our net business
formation index is a measure of net entry, while the model variable NE;t corresponds to gross
entry.
Net Entry First, we match net business formation in the data with net entry in the model,
which we dene as NNE;t. Net entry equals entry NE;t minus exit (Nt + NE;t). Net entry
in steady state is zero. Therefore, we express net entry in deviations from the steady state
number of entrants,
N^NE;t = (1  ) (N^E;t   N^t). (22)
The estimation results are not strongly a¤ected by this alternative mapping, see Table 3c,
column Net Entry. This is not surprising since exit is exogenous in the model.
New Incorporations Second, we match NE;t in the model with the number of New
Incorporations, a data series provided by the BEAs Survey of Current Business together
with net business formation. The sample period is almost the same as in the baseline
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estimation. We do not observe a large impact on estimation results (Table 3c, column NI)
other than a drop in the entry adjustment cost parameter 'N .
Establishment Births Third, we use an alternative measure of rm entry based on estab-
lishment data. The column Birthsshows the estimation results when NE;t is measured as
Establishment Births. Data are obtained from the BLS and span the period 1993q2-2007q4.
Also here, the entry adjustment cost drops signicantly. In addition, the monetary policy
response to output and the properties of some of the shock processes are changed. Impor-
tantly, the estimates of the key parameters of interest, " and , do not change signicantly
when we use establishment entry instead of rm entry.
In sum, our estimates of the demand elasticity and the competition e¤ect are robust to
alternative ways of mapping entry in the model to the data.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the empirical importance of changes in market structure and compe-
tition for business cycle dynamics in the US. We allow for an inverse relationship between
markups and entry rates as observed in the industrial organization literature. In response
to expanding prot opportunities, more rms and products enter, which heightens compet-
itive pressures and reduces desired markups and ination. To quantify the relevance of this
mechanism for cyclical uctuations, we estimate using Bayesian methods a sticky-price
business cycle model with sunk-cost driven entry dynamics and a translog expenditure func-
tion. We obtain two main results. Our rst nding is that the impact of entry on markups
and ination is shock-dependent. In the case of supply shocks and monetary policy shocks,
entry is procyclical, which generates countercyclical markups and dampens ination. The
opposite is true for demand shocks. Overall, the model-implied markup is countercyclical,
due to a combination of markup shocks and changes in desired markups due to entry. In
a counterfactual exercise where sticky prices are the only source of markup variations, the
model-implied markup is, in contrast, procyclical. Second, our parameter estimates indicate
that a one percent increase in the number of rms and goods decreases desired markups by
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0.17 percent. While a substantial part of US ination is driven by a combination of sticky
prices and exogenous markup shocks, the contribution of the competition e¤ect to ination
uctuations is non-negligible. An interesting question for future research is to what extent
the observed interest rate path was consistent with the optimal monetary policy prescription.
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Table 1: Exogenous Shock Processes 
    
Supply 
Shocks 
Total factor productivity shock  𝜍̂𝑡𝑍   = 𝜌𝑍𝜍̂𝑡−1𝑍 + 𝜀?̂?𝑍 
Entry cost shock 𝜍̂𝑡𝐸   = 𝜌𝐸𝜍?̂?−1𝐸 + 𝜀?̂?𝐸 
Wage markup shock 𝜍̂𝑡𝑊  = 𝜌𝑊𝜍̂𝑡−1𝑊 + 𝜀?̂?𝑊 − 𝜇𝑊𝜀?̂?−1𝑊  
 
Demand  
Shocks 
Government spending shock 𝜍̂𝑡𝐺   = 𝜌𝐺𝜍̂𝑡−1𝐺 + 𝜀?̂?𝐺 + 𝜌𝐺𝑍𝜀?̂?𝑍 
Investment-specific technology shock 𝜍̂𝑡𝐼    = 𝜌𝐼𝜍̂𝑡−1𝐼 + 𝜀?̂?𝐼 
Time preference shock 𝜍̂𝑡𝑇   = 𝜌𝑇𝜍̂𝑡−1𝑇 + 𝜀?̂?𝑇 
 
 
Monetary policy shock 𝜍̂𝑡𝑅   = 𝜌𝑅𝜍̂𝑡−1𝑅 + 𝜀?̂?𝑅 
Price markup shock 𝜍̂𝑡𝑃   = 𝜌𝑃𝜍̂𝑡−1𝑃 + 𝜀?̂?𝑃 − 𝜇𝑃𝜀?̂?−1𝑃  
    
Note: In each shock process i, the innovations 𝜀?̂?𝑖 are independently and identically distributed random variables 
following a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑖2. 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results: Baseline Model 
 
ESTIMATED STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS Posterior SHOCKS AR(1), MA(1) Posterior 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
Symbol Description Prior (P1,P2) Mode Mean [5th; 95th %ile ]  Symbol Prior (P1,P2) Mode Mean [5th; 95th %ile ] 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
b Consumption habit B (0.70, 0.10) 0.69 0.70 [0.64; 0.76]    B (0.50, 0.15) 0.98 0.98 [0.97;0.99] 
   Consumption utility N (1.5, 0.375) 1.58 1.46 [0.97; 1.92]    B (0.50, 0.15) 0.15 0.18 [0.08; 0.28] 
   Consumption labor N (2.00, 0.75) 1.95 1.86 [0.89; 2.84]    B (0.50, 0.15) 0.43 0.42 [0.33; 0.52] 
   
 
 
   B (0.50, 0.15) 0.90 0.90 [0.87; 0.92] 
   Investment adj. cost N (4.00, 1.50) 8.55 8.71 [6.63; 10.82]    B (0.50, 0.15) 0.79 0.77 [0.69; 0.85] 
   Entry adj. cost N (4.00, 1.50) 2.14 2.42 [1.70; 3.13]    B (0.50, 0.15) 0.97 0.95 [0.89; 0.99] 
    Capacity util. cost B (0.50, 0.15) 0.73 0.73 [0.59; 0.88]    B (0.50, 0.15) 0.16 0.17 [0.08; 0.25] 
   
 
 
   B (0.50, 0.15) 0.85 0.85 [0.81; 0.89] 
   Indexation prices B (0.50, 0.15) 0.38 0.43 [0.23; 0.63]     B (0.50, 0.15) 0.78 0.75 [0.58; 0.91] 
   Price rigidity G (50.0, 7.50) 51.84 62.01 [49.98; 74.18]    B (0.50, 0.15) 0.59 0.58 [0.44; 0.73] 
   Indexation wages B (0.50, 0.15) 0.52 0.51 [0.32; 0.69]    B (0.50, 0.15) 0.52 0.49 [0.33; 0.65] 
   Wage rigidity G (50.0, 7.50) 53.92 56.99 [44.61; 69.28] 
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
  Demand elasticity N (4.00, 1.50) 5.47 6.09 [4.76; 7.37] 
  
 
 
  Competition effect 
 
0.16 0.17 [0.13; 0.21] 
  
 
 
   
 
 
SHOCK INNOVATIONS  
   Interest smoothing B (0.75, 0.10) 0.73 0.73 [0.69; 0.78] 
  
 
 
   Policy inflation G (1.50, 0.25) 1.45 1.49 [1.32; 1.66]    IG (0.10, 2) 0.82 0.83 [0.74; 0.91] 
   Policy output G (0.50, 0.25) 0.01 0.01 [0.003; 0.02]    IG (0.10, 2) 0.27 0.27 [0.23; 0.31] 
    Policy lagged output G (0.50, 0.25) 0.11 0.11 [0.08; 0.14]    IG (0.10, 2) 1.36 1.39 [1.14; 1.64] 
   
 
 
   IG (0.10, 2) 3.13 3.15 [2.81; 3.48] 
CALIBRATED STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS  
 
   IG (0.10, 2) 0.25 0.26 [0.20; 0.33] 
   
 
 
   IG (0.10, 2) 0.43 0.43 [0.36; 0.50] 
  Discount factor 
 
 0.99    IG (0.10, 2) 0.25 0.25 [0.23; 0.28] 
  Capital share in production  0.24    IG (0.10, 2) 3.19 3.37 [2.83; 3.90] 
   Firm exit rate  0.025 
  
 
 
   Capital depreciation  rate  0.025 
  
 
 
   Elasticity of substitution labor types  3 
  
 
 
G/Yc Exogenous spending share 
 
0.21 
  
 
 
     
 
 
 
Note: B = Beta, G = Gamma, IG = Inverse Gamma and N = Normal distributions. P1 = Mean and P2 = Standard 
deviation for all distributions. Posterior moments are computed using 576,000 draws from the distribution simulated 
by the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. 
 
Table 3a: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
  
PRIOR POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION: Mean [5th; 95th %ile ] 
Symbol Description (P1,P2) Baseline Flex-Price Asym-PF 
     
 
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
    b Consumption habit B (0.70, 0.10) 0.70 [0.64; 0.76] 0.68 [0.60; 0.77] 0.68 [0.62; 0.74] 
   Consumption utility N (1.5, 0.375) 1.46 [0.97; 1.92] 1.35 [0.82; 1.85] 1.98 [1.59; 2.35] 
   Consumption labor N (2.00, 0.75) 1.86 [0.89; 2.84] 2.34 [1.23; 3.40] 2.59 [1.66; 3.50] 
   Investment adj. cost N (4.00, 1.50) 8.71 [6.63; 10.82] 8.52 [6.33; 10.78] 7.70 [5.75; 9.59] 
   Entry adj. cost N (4.00, 1.50) 2.42 [1.70; 3.13] 3.69 [2.70; 4.62] 1.52 [1.18; 1.86] 
    Capacity util. cost B (0.50, 0.15) 0.73 [0.59; 0.88] 0.88 [0.81; 0.96] 0.88 [0.81; 0.96] 
   Indexation prices 
B (0.50, 0.15) 0.43 [0.23; 0.63] 
 
0.89 [0.82; 0.96] 
0 
 
0 
 
   Price rigidity 
G (50.0, 7.50) 62.01 [49.98; 74.18] 
 
69.60 [56.1; 82.3] 
0.01 
 
0.01 
    Indexation wages B (0.50, 0.15) 0.51 [0.32; 0.69] 0.82 [0.70; 0.94] 0.61 [0.43; 0.79] 
   Wage rigidity G (50.0, 7.50) 56.99 [44.61; 69.28] 49.60 [37.4; 61.4] 58.03 [45.8; 69.9] 
  Demand elasticity N (4.00, 1.50) 6.09 [4.76; 7.37] 9.06 [7.40; 10.66] 9.08 [7.71; 10.46] 
  Competition effect 
 
0.17 [0.13; 0.21] 0.11 [0.09; 0.13] 0.11 [0.10; 0.13] 
   Interest smoothing B (0.75, 0.10) 0.73 [0.69; 0.78] 0.73 [0.68; 0.78] 0.77 [0.73; 0.80] 
   Policy inflation G (1.50, 0.25) 1.49 [1.32; 1.66] 1.50 [1.31; 1.68] 1.43 [1.28; 1.57] 
   Policy output G (0.50, 0.25) 0.01 [0.003; 0.02] 0.02 [0.01; 0.03] 0.06 [0.04; 0.08] 
    Policy lagged output 
G (0.50, 0.25) 0.11 [0.08; 0.14]  0.14 [0.10; 0.17] 
0 
 
0  
     
 
AR(1), MA(1) 
       TFP B (0.50, 0.15) 0.98 [0.97;0.99] 0.98 [0.98;0.99] 0.98 [0.98;0.99] 
   Time Preference B (0.50, 0.15) 0.18 [0.08; 0.28] 0.24 [0.11; 0.36] 0.18 [0.08; 0.28] 
   Inv. Spec. Tech. B (0.50, 0.15) 0.42 [0.33; 0.52] 0.47 [0.37; 0.58] 0.48 [0.40; 0.57] 
   Gov. Spending B (0.50, 0.15) 0.90 [0.87; 0.92] 0.89 [0.86; 0.92] 0.89 [0.86; 0.92] 
   Price Markup AR(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.77 [0.69; 0.85] 0.83 [0.78; 0.87] 0.54 [0.44; 0.65] 
   Wage Markup AR(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.95 [0.89; 0.99] 0.94 [0.86; 0.99] 0.99 [0.98; 0.99] 
   Monetary Policy B (0.50, 0.15) 0.17 [0.08; 0.25] 0.20 [0.11; 0.29] 0.09 [0.04; 0.15] 
   Entry Cost B (0.50, 0.15) 0.85 [0.81; 0.89] 0.86 [0.83; 0.90] 0.84 [0.81; 0.87] 
    Corr. TFP – Gov. B (0.50, 0.15) 0.75 [0.58; 0.91] 0.78 [0.64; 0.93] 0.79 [0.66; 0.93] 
   Wage Markup MA(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.58 [0.44; 0.73] 0.57 [0.43; 0.70] 0.52 [0.36; 0.68] 
   Price Markup MA(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.49 [0.33; 0.65] 0.12 [0.05; 0.19] 0.33 [0.18; 0.48] 
  
 
  
 
INNOVATIONS  
      TFP IG (0.10, 2) 0.83 [0.74; 0.91] 0.80 [0.73; 0.88] 0.94 [0.84; 1.03] 
   Time Preference IG (0.10, 2) 0.27 [0.23; 0.31] 0.27 [0.22; 0.31] 0.29 [0.25; 0.33] 
   Inv. Spec. Tech. IG (0.10, 2) 1.39 [1.14; 1.64] 1.18 [0.97; 1.40] 1.17 [0.98; 1.37] 
   Gov. Spending IG (0.10, 2) 3.15 [2.81; 3.48] 2.91 [2.62; 3.19] 2.84 [2.57; 3.12] 
   Price Markup IG (0.10, 2) 0.26 [0.20; 0.33] 0.77 [0.70; 0.85] 0.51 [0.44; 0.59] 
   Wage Markup IG (0.10, 2) 0.43 [0.36; 0.50] 0.49 [0.41; 0.56] 0.42 [0.35; 0.49] 
   Monetary Policy IG (0.10, 2) 0.25 [0.23; 0.28] 0.26 [0.23; 0.28] 0.25 [0.23; 0.28] 
   Entry Cost IG (0.10, 2) 3.37 [2.83; 3.90] 4.06 [3.38; 4.70] 3.03 [2.59; 3.44] 
      
MODEL COMPARISON     
Log Marginal Data Density  -1449.744953 -1598.083439 -1524.803954 
Bayes Factor            
                 
  1          
               
     
 
Note: ‘Flex-Price’ indicates the model variant with flexible prices. ‘Asym-PF’ features an asymmetric production 
structure for the entry and goods producing sector. B = Beta, G = Gamma, IG = Inverse Gamma and N = Normal 
distributions. P1 = Mean and P2 = Standard deviation for all distributions. Posterior moments are computed using 
576,000 draws from the distribution simulated by the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. 
Table 3b: Sensitivity Analysis (continued) 
 
  
PRIOR POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION: Mean [5th; 95th %ile ] 
Symbol Description (P1,P2) Baseline PPI Profits Markup 
     
   
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
    
  
b Consumption habit B (0.70, 0.10) 0.70 [0.64; 0.76] 0.56 [0.48; 0.63] 0.71 [0.64; 0.78] 0.70 [0.64; 0.77] 
   Consumption utility N (1.5, 0.375) 1.46 [0.97; 1.92] 1.56 [1.23; 1.90] 1.37 [0.90; 1.85] 1.44 [0.94; 1.93] 
   Consumption labor N (2.00, 0.75) 1.86 [0.89; 2.84] 1.73 [0.81; 2.65] 1.74 [0.74; 2.69] 1.85 [0.86; 3.80] 
   Investment adj. cost N (4.00, 1.50) 8.71 [6.63; 10.82] 7.32 [5.35; 9.28] 8.64 [6.48; 10.73] 8.73 [6.56; 10.79] 
   Entry adj. cost N (4.00, 1.50) 2.42 [1.70; 3.13] 2.93 [2.12; 3.75] 3.21 [2.42; 4.00] 2.79 [1.98; 3.56] 
    Capacity util. cost B (0.50, 0.15) 0.73 [0.59; 0.88] 0.38 [0.22; 0.54] 0.74 [0.61; 0.88] 0.75 [0.62; 0.89] 
   Indexation prices B (0.50, 0.15) 0.43 [0.23; 0.63] 0.17 [0.06; 0.27] 0.49 [0.27; 0.70] 0.46 [0.25; 0.67] 
   Price rigidity G (50.0, 7.50) 62.01 [50.0; 74.1] 36.36 [27.0; 45.2] 65.55 [52.7; 77.9] 63.34 [50.8; 75.3] 
   Indexation wages B (0.50, 0.15) 0.51 [0.32; 0.69] 0.22 [0.12; 0.32] 0.53 [0.35; 0.72] 0.53 [0.34; 0.71] 
   Wage rigidity G (50.0, 7.50) 56.99 [44.6; 69.3] 59.57 [46.5; 72.0] 56.99 [44.1; 69.3] 57.04 [44.6; 69.4] 
  Demand elasticity N (4.00, 1.50) 6.09 [4.76; 7.37] 8.59 [6.77; 10.45] 8.57 [7.62; 9.51] 7.20 [5.83; 8.56] 
  Competition effect 
 
0.17 [0.13; 0.21] 0.12 [0.09; 0.15] 0.12 [0.10; 0.13] 0.14 [0.12; 0.17] 
   Interest smoothing B (0.75, 0.10) 0.73 [0.69; 0.78] 0.80 [0.77; 0.84] 0.74 [0.69; 0.78] 0.74 [0.69; 0.78] 
   Policy inflation G (1.50, 0.25) 1.49 [1.32; 1.66] 1.53 [1.30; 1.75] 1.53 [1.35; 1.72] 1.52 [1.34; 1.70] 
   Policy output G (0.50, 0.25) 0.01 [0.003; 0.02] 0.01 [0.01; 0.02] 0.01 [0.01; 0.02] 0.01 [0.01; 0.02] 
    Policy lagged output G (0.50, 0.25) 0.11 [0.08; 0.14] 0.18 [0.15; 0.21] 0.11 [0.08; 0.14] 0.11 [0.08; 0.14] 
      
 
AR(1), MA(1) 
    
 
   TFP B (0.50, 0.15) 0.98 [0.97;0.99] 0.98 [0.98; 0.99] 0.98 [0.98;0.99] 0.98 [0.98;0.99] 
   Time Preference B (0.50, 0.15) 0.18 [0.08; 0.28] 0.30 [0.17; 0.43] 0.18 [0.08; 0.28] 0.18 [0.07; 0.27] 
   Inv. Spec. Tech. B (0.50, 0.15) 0.42 [0.33; 0.52] 0.42 [0.32; 0.51] 0.45 [0.36; 0.54] 0.43 [0.34; 0.52] 
   Gov. Spending B (0.50, 0.15) 0.90 [0.87; 0.92] 0.89 [0.86; 0.92] 0.89 [0.86; 0.92] 0.90 [0.87; 0.92] 
   Price Markup AR(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.77 [0.69; 0.85] 0.73 [0.65; 0.81] 0.75 [0.67; 0.83] 0.76 [0.68; 0.84] 
   Wage Markup AR(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.95 [0.89; 0.99] 0.98 [0.97; 0.99] 0.93 [0.85; 0.99] 0.94 [0.86; 0.99] 
   Monetary Policy B (0.50, 0.15) 0.17 [0.08; 0.25] 0.10 [0.04; 0.15] 0.18 [0.09; 0.27] 0.17 [0.08; 0.26] 
   Entry Cost B (0.50, 0.15) 0.85 [0.81; 0.89] 0.87 [0.84; 0.91] 0.86 [0.82; 0.89] 0.85 [0.82; 0.89] 
    Corr. TFP – Gov. B (0.50, 0.15) 0.75 [0.58; 0.91] 0.76 [0.61; 0.91] 0.76 [0.61; 0.92] 0.76 [0.61; 0.92] 
   Wage Markup MA(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.58 [0.44; 0.73] 0.64 [0.51; 0.78] 0.60 [0.46; 0.74] 0.59 [0.45; 0.73] 
   Price Markup MA(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.49 [0.33; 0.65] 0.37 [0.20; 0.54] 0.45 [0.29; 0.61] 0.46 [0.30; 0.62] 
  
 
   
 
INNOVATIONS  
   
 
   TFP IG (0.10, 2) 0.83 [0.74; 0.91] 1.10 [0.99; 1.21] 0.79 [0.72; 0.87] 0.81 [0.73; 0.89] 
   Time Preference IG (0.10, 2) 0.27 [0.23; 0.31] 0.30 [0.24; 0.36] 0.28 [0.24; 0.31] 0.27 [0.23; 0.31] 
   Inv. Spec. Tech. IG (0.10, 2) 1.39 [1.14; 1.64] 1.25 [1.01; 1.48] 1.21 [1.00; 1.42] 1.31 [1.06; 1.54] 
   Gov. Spending IG (0.10, 2) 3.15 [2.81; 3.48] 2.97 [2.66; 3.27] 2.94 [2.66; 3.22] 3.03 [2.72; 3.34] 
   Price Markup IG (0.10, 2) 0.26 [0.20; 0.33] 0.62 [0.51; 0.72] 0.30 [0.23; 0.36] 0.28 [0.21; 0.34] 
   Wage Markup IG (0.10, 2) 0.43 [0.36; 0.50] 0.42 [0.34; 0.49] 0.43 [0.36; 0.50] 0.43 [0.36; 0.50] 
   Monetary Policy IG (0.10, 2) 0.25 [0.23; 0.28] 0.26 [0.23; 0.28] 0.25 [0.22; 0.28] 0.25 [0.23; 0.28] 
   Entry Cost IG (0.10, 2) 3.37 [2.83; 3.90] 3.61 [2.99; 4.18] 3.82 [3.24; 4.40] 3.57 [3.01; 4.13] 
   Profit Meas. Error IG (0.10, 2)   12.43 [11.2; 13.6]  
   Markup Meas. Error IG (0.10, 2)    2.07 [1.87; 2.26] 
       
 
Note: ‘PPI’ estimates the model using producer price index as alternative to GDP deflator. ‘Profits’ uses profit data in 
the estimation and introduces a measurement error in (6). ‘Markup’ denotes the use of the inverse labor share as a 
markup measure and introduces a measurement error to price markups. B = Beta, G = Gamma, IG = Inverse Gamma 
and N = Normal distributions. P1 = Mean and P2 = Standard deviation for all distributions. Posterior moments are 
computed using 576,000 draws from the distribution simulated by the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. 
Table 3c: Sensitivity Analysis (continued) 
 
  
PRIOR 
POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION: Mean [5th; 95th %ile ] 
Symbol Description (P1,P2) Baseline Net Entry NI Births 
   
 
 
  
 
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
 
 
 
  
 b Consumption habit B (0.70, 0.10) 0.70 [0.64; 0.76] 0.71 [0.65; 0.76] 0.73 [0.67; 0.78] 0.63 [0.49; 0.78] 
   Consumption utility N (1.5, 0.375) 1.46 [0.97; 1.92] 1.45 [1.00; 1.87] 1.57 [1.05; 1.87] 1.76 [1.31; 2.22] 
   Consumption labor N (2.00, 0.75) 1.86 [0.89; 2.84] 1.85 [0.92; 2.75] 2.05 [1.10; 2.97] 2.40 [1.26; 3.51] 
   Investment adj. cost N (4.00, 1.50) 8.71 [6.63; 10.82] 8.81 [6.80; 10.81] 7.35 [5.43; 9.30] 4.83 [2.69; 6.98] 
   Entry adj. cost N (4.00, 1.50) 2.42 [1.70; 3.13] 2.28 [1.62; 2.93] 0.89 [0.69; 1.08] 0.52 [0.40; 0.65] 
    Capacity util. cost B (0.50, 0.15) 0.73 [0.59; 0.88] 0.76 [0.63; 0.90] 0.69 [0.54; 0.85] 0.68 [0.50; 0.86] 
   Indexation prices B (0.50, 0.15) 0.43 [0.23; 0.63] 0.41 [0.21; 0.60] 0.26 [0.18; 0.54] 0.36 [0.15; 0.57] 
   Price rigidity G (50.0, 7.50) 62.01 [50.0; 74.1] 61.78 [50.0; 73.9] 62.52 [50.6; 74.4] 63.71 [50.5; 76.2] 
   Indexation wages B (0.50, 0.15) 0.51 [0.32; 0.69] 0.51 [0.32; 0.69] 0.52 [0.33; 0.71] 0.47 [0.23; 0.72] 
   Wage rigidity G (50.0, 7.50) 56.99 [44.6; 69.3] 57.04 [44.8; 69.1] 56.87 [45.0; 69.1] 52.00 [40.1; 64.0] 
  Demand elasticity N (4.00, 1.50) 6.09 [4.76; 7.37] 5.76 [4.55; 6.95] 5.36 [4.51; 6.18] 4.52 [3.49; 5.49] 
  Competition effect 
 
0.17 [0.13; 0.21] 0.18 [0.14; 0.22] 0.19 [0.16; 0.22] 0.22 [0.17; 0.27] 
   Interest smoothing B (0.75, 0.10) 0.73 [0.69; 0.78] 0.73 [0.69; 0.77] 0.75 [0.71; 0.79] 0.86 [0.82; 0.90] 
   Policy inflation G (1.50, 0.25) 1.49 [1.32; 1.66] 1.47[1.30; 1.63] 1.55 [1.36; 1.73] 1.90 [1.48; 2.30] 
   Policy output G (0.50, 0.25) 0.01 [0.003; 0.02] 0.01 [0.01; 0.02] 0.01 [0.01; 0.02] 0.21 [0.09; 0.34] 
    Policy lagged output G (0.50, 0.25) 0.11 [0.08; 0.14] 0.11 [0.08; 0.14] 0.11 [0.08; 0.15] 0.07 [0.03; 0.10] 
   
 
   
AR(1), MA(1) 
 
 
      TFP B (0.50, 0.15) 0.98 [0.97;0.99] 0.98 [0.98; 0.99] 0.98 [0.98;0.99] 0.59 [0.46;0.73] 
   Time Impatience B (0.50, 0.15) 0.18 [0.08; 0.28] 0.18 [0.08; 0.28] 0.17 [0.07; 0.26] 0.71 [0.58; 0.85] 
   Inv. Spec. Tech. B (0.50, 0.15) 0.42 [0.33; 0.52] 0.40 [0.30; 0.50] 0.52 [0.43; 0.61] 0.46 [0.33; 0.59] 
   Gov. Spending B (0.50, 0.15) 0.90 [0.87; 0.92] 0.89 [0.87; 0.92] 0.89 [0.86; 0.92] 0.88 [0.80; 0.96] 
   Price Markup AR(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.77 [0.69; 0.85] 0.77 [0.70; 0.86] 0.77 [0.68; 0.86] 0.74 [0.62; 0.87] 
   Wage Markup AR(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.95 [0.89; 0.99] 0.95 [0.91; 0.99] 0.96 [0.93; 0.99] 0.51 [0.32; 0.71] 
   Monetary Policy B (0.50, 0.15) 0.17 [0.08; 0.25] 0.17 [0.08; 0.25] 0.15 [0.07; 0.22] 0.46 [0.31; 0.62] 
   Entry Cost B (0.50, 0.15) 0.85 [0.81; 0.89] 0.85 [0.82; 0.89] 0.82 [0.78; 0.86] 0.55 [0.43; 0.67] 
    Corr. TFP – Gov. B (0.50, 0.15) 0.75 [0.58; 0.91] 0.74 [0.58; 0.91] 0.72 [0.56; 0.90] 0.58 [0.36; 0.82] 
   Wage Markup MA(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.58 [0.44; 0.73] 0.59 [0.45; 0.74] 0.51 [0.34; 0.67] 0.47 [0.27; 0.65] 
   Price Markup MA(1) B (0.50, 0.15) 0.49 [0.33; 0.65] 0.49 [0.33; 0.69] 0.50 [0.34; 0.67] 0.45 [0.26; 0.66] 
  
  
   
INNOVATIONS   
      TFP IG (0.10, 2) 0.83 [0.74; 0.91] 0.83 [0.75; 0.92] 0.85 [0.76; 0.93] 0.65 [0.53; 0.76] 
   Time Impatience IG (0.10, 2) 0.27 [0.23; 0.31] 0.27 [0.23; 0.31] 0.27 [0.23; 0.31] 0.08 [0.05; 0.11] 
   Inv. Spec. Tech. IG (0.10, 2) 1.39 [1.14; 1.64] 1.43 [1.17; 1.70] 1.16 [0.97; 1.36] 1.34 [0.98; 1.71] 
   Gov. Spending IG (0.10, 2) 3.15 [2.81; 3.48] 3.17 [2.83; 3.51] 3.24 [2.91; 3.58] 2.43 [2.01; 2.82] 
   Price Markup IG (0.10, 2) 0.26 [0.20; 0.33] 0.26 [0.20; 0.32] 0.25 [0.20; 0.30] 0.15 [0.10; 0.19] 
   Wage Markup IG (0.10, 2) 0.43 [0.36; 0.50] 0.43 [0.36; 0.49] 0.42 [0.35; 0.49] 0.84 [0.67; 1.01] 
   Monetary Policy IG (0.10, 2) 0.25 [0.23; 0.28] 0.25 [0.23; 0.28] 0.25 [0.23; 0.28] 0.09 [0.08; 0.11] 
   Entry Cost IG (0.10, 2) 3.37 [2.83; 3.90] 3.31 [2.79; 3.81] 3.31 [2.85; 3.78] 3.28 [2.60; 3.91] 
       
 
Note: ‘Net Entry’ matches the series of net business formation with net entry in the model. ‘NI’ denotes the use of data 
on New Incorporations instead of data on net business formation. ‘Births’ estimates the model on a later sample using 
establishment data. B = Beta, G = Gamma, IG = Inverse Gamma and N = Normal distributions. P1 = Mean and P2 = 
Standard deviation for all distributions. Posterior moments are computed using 576,000 draws from the distribution 
simulated by the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. 
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Figure 3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (at posterior mode) 
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